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Recently, the Supreme Court, in Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education, held school districts liable under Title IX for deliberate
indifference to known instances of student-on-student sexual "harassment
that is so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that it effectively bars
the victim's access to an educational opportunity or benefit."' While I
generally agree with the result in the Davis case, I am dissatisfied with the
majority opinion that failed to adequately address the concerns (dare I say
criticisms) of the dissent. Although, one could take the view that the
criticisms are frivolous and not worth the effort to address, the concerns are
legitimate yet misconceived. I will address three primary concerns raised
by the Davis dissent and attempt to dispel them by addressing them directly
as the majority should have done.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia
and Thomas, wrote a rather scathing dissenting opinion, claiming the
majority had insinuated the federal government into one of the most
traditional areas of state concern, and concluded that there are "few
interventions more intrusive upon the delicate and vital relations between
teacher and student, between student and student, and between the state and
its citizens than the one the Court creates... by its own hands."2 The
dissent viewed this case as one primarily about federalism, meaning an
issue best left to the states, arguing that preserving the federal system is
both a legitimate end itself as well as a means for ensuring that choices are
made by a government more closely involved with the electorate than the
* Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. My thanks
to the editors of the Hastings Women's Law Journal for inviting me to participate in such an
outstanding symposium.
1. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
2. Id. at 685 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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vast federal government.'
While it is true that control over the education of our nation's children
has traditionally been relegated to the states, the conduct here is not, as the
dissent characterized it, merely misconduct best addressed by the school
under its student discipline procedures. Of course, when one student
harasses another student, it is a matter of school discipline. However, this
case concerns a special type of harassment-harassment based on gender
which is so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that it effectively
bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity. The dissent refused
to concede that such student-on-student harassment is sexual harassment,
much less sex discrimination, because of the immaturity of students and the
lack of a power relationship between the harasser and the victim.' The
dissent characterized the conduct as clearly inappropriate, immature,
childish and even objectively offensive, but claimed it merely represented
"children in the throes of adolescence struggle to express their emerging
sexual identities. 6 However, a strong argument can be made that such
conduct rises to a level of sex discrimination and thus invokes a special
need for the federal courts to step in. The majority never once mentioned
the word federalism and while it did find that such conduct constitutes sex
discrimination,7 it failed to explain the underlying theoretical basis for such
a finding. Thus, the majority opinion is less persuasive than it might have
been.
Additionally, the dissent claimed that the majority failed to
acknowledge the limits upon schools' ability to discipline students. The
dissent provided a laundry list of limitations, which prevent schools from
taking certain actions, including the harasser's right to freedom of speech.8
Specifically, the dissent argued that a student's request for the school to
remedy peer sexual harassment will conflict with the alleged harasser's
claim that his speech is protected, citing the controversy over university
speech codes designed to deal with peer sexual and racial harassment.9 The
majority did acknowledge that schools are constrained in their disciplinary
authority but stated that the standard is sufficiently flexible to account for
any constraint.' ° This response is somewhat less than satisfying. In fact,
the school First Amendment cases generally support primary and secondary
schools' right to discipline students and the speech code cases can be
3. See id. at 684-85.
4. See id. at 631.
5. See id. at 673 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
6. Id.
7. See id. at 650.
8. See id. at 664-68 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (including state Constitutional rights to
free primary and secondary education, federal due process rights, and the IDEA).
9. See id. at 667.
10. See id. at 648-49.
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distinguished.
Thus, I attempt to make the majority's decision more compelling by
directly addressing these three issues: (1) why the decision in this case is
consistent with our federalism principles; (2) why the conduct at issue is
sex discrimination and (3) why the First Amendment rights of the alleged
harassers will not likely be a concern under the standard adopted by the
majority.
II. FEDERALISM
While the term "federalism" has recently come to represent a position
of empowering states' rights, it more accurately reflects a dual sovereign
system in which the powers of government are divided in order to promote
citizen satisfaction and governmental efficiency." Under federalism
principles, not only are the states to be protected from an overreaching
federal power, but the national government is empowered to act when
appropriate.
2
A. ERADICATING SEX DISCRIMINATION IN SCHOOLS IS A NATIONAL
PRIORITY
To determine the appropriate allocation of responsibilities between the
two sovereigns, we should consider the virtues of federalism. Justice
O'Connor, in Gregory v. Ashcroft,'3 enumerated the traditional values
embodied in our federalist structure. Federalism is designed to (1)
decentralize government such that it is more sensitive to the diverse needs
of its citizens, (2) increase opportunity for citizen involvement in the
democratic process, (3) allow for more innovation and experimentation and
(4) make government more responsive by putting states in competition with
each other.' 4 Thus, when regulating an area that is sensitive to local
conditions or is of recent vintage, such that state experimentation is
beneficial, the power should be relegated to the individual states. This
allows for local taste or experimentation to achieve a variety of solutions.
Of course, the result is a patchwork of diverse laws, many of which may be
unacceptable to citizens of other states. When, however, we as a society
have established certain principles of liberty and justice so fundamental as
to be guaranteed to all Americans, the national government rightly grants
11. See Geoffrey Moulton, The Quixotic Search for a Judicially Enforceable Federalism,
83 MiNN. L. REv. 849, 852 (1999).
12. See id.
13. 501 U.S. 452,455 (1991).
14. See id. at 458.
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and polices those rights.'5 Thus, an appropriate allocation of powers will
allow the nation to reap the benefits of both interstate diversity and national
uniformity.
Was then the dissent correct that this case was primarily about
federalism? I believe it is a matter of federalism, properly understood, and
that the decision was in fact consistent with federalism principles. Title IX
was enacted pursuant to Congress' spending power 6 but reflects and
enforces Fourteenth Amendment principles of equal protection. 7 By
labeling the conduct as mere "discipline," and comparing it to teasing
based on weight or wearing glasses," the dissent failed to recognize the
important federal interest at stake. If one accepts that actionable student-
on-student sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination, then one must
recognize that it is a matter of national concern and requires a uniform,
national approach to address the concern. This is not a case in need of state
experimentation or a diverse approach to satisfy local interests. Rather, we
as a society have established a principle of equal protection under the laws
and equal treatment of the sexes as a fundamental right guaranteed to all
citizens. Thus, it is consistent with the underlying tenets of federalism to
create a federal case out of student-on-student sexual harassment that rises
to the level of sex discrimination. 9
B. STATES' ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY
The Eleventh Amendment is an important constitutional safeguard of
our federalist system of government. The Eleventh Amendment provides
that "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State."2°  In general, this provision protects states'
sovereignty from encroachment by the federal courts.
This Amendment raises a significant issue in the context of Title IX
liability. Title IX liability is limited to entities, both public and private, that
receive federal funding.2' Chief among the potentially liable entities are
15. See Martin Feigenbaum, The Preservation of hdividual Liberty Through the
Separation of Powers and Federalism: Reflections on the Shaping of Constitutional
Immortality, 37 EMORY L.J. 613, 622 (1988).
16. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 637 (1999).
17. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 n.8 (1992).
18. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 677 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
19. See discussion infra Part III (justifying contention that actionable student-on-student
sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
21. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000) ("No person... shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
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public schools, which may be deemed state actors for purposes of the
Eleventh Amendment, and may, thus, attempt to claim immunity from suit
in federal court.' Immunity from suit, however, is not absolute. There are
two circumstances in which an individual may sue a state. "First, Congress
may authorize such a suit in the exercise of its power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment-an Amendment enacted after the Eleventh
Amendment and specifically designed to alter the federal-state balance.
Second, a state may waive its sovereign immunity by consenting to suit."
2
The lower courts are currently divided over the issue of whether Congress
had the authority to abrogate states' immunity under Title IX when it
amended the Rehabilitation Act of 1986 to state: "A State shall not be
immune under the Eleventh Amendment... from suit in Federal court for a
violation of... Title IX of the Education Amendments .... 2,' The issue
turns on whether Congress passed Title IX pursuant to its Section Five
power under the Fourteenth Amendment.26 The Court has held that
Congress passed Title IX pursuant to its Spending Clause powere7 but has
failed to address whether Congress could have acted under its Section Five
powers as well.' This is critical because in Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, the Court held that Congress lacks power under Article I to
abrogate the states' sovereign immunityY Thus, if Title IX rests solely on
under any educational program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.")
(emphasis added).
22. See, e.g., Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding
GMU a state instrumentality); Franks v. Kentucky Sch. for the Deaf, 142 F.3d 360, 361 (6th
Cir. 1998) (addressing state immunity argument raised by Kentucky School for the Deaf and
the State Board for Elementary and Secondary Education of Kentucky).
23. College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 670 (1999).
24. Compare Franks, 142 F.3d at 363; Doe v. University of M., 138 F.3d 653, 660 (7th
Cir. 1998); and Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1283 (8th Cir. 1997) (valid abrogation of
immunity under Title IX) with Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1012
n.14 (5th Cir. 1996); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1397-99 (1 1th
Cir. 1997); Litman v. George Mason Univ., 5 F. Supp. 2d 366, 373 (E.D. Va. 1998) (invalid
abrogation of immunity under Title IX) (on appeal the Fourth Circuit declined to address the
issue of abrogation).
25. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (2000).
26. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5 ('The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
27. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Ind. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 287 (1998). The Spending
Clause provides that "Congress shall have [the] Power to ... provide for the.., general
Welfare of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
28. See Franklin v. Gwinnet County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60,75 n.8 (1992).
29. 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996). The Court is closely divided over this decision. Just this
term, the dissent in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 93-97 (2000), disagreed
with the holding of Seminole Tribe that Congress lacks the power under its Article I powers
to abrogate states' immunity, arguing:
Congress' power to authorize federal remedies against state agencies that
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Congress' Article I spending power, harassed students cannot maintain
their suits against public schools deemed state instrumentalities unless they
can demonstrate that the state waived its sovereign immunity by accepting
federal funds. The Supreme Court has recently addressed both the scope of
Congress' power to abrogate states' immunity and to provide for states'
waiver of immunity.
1. Abrogating States' Immunity
This term the Supreme Court in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,0 a
closely divided five to four decision, held that Congress had exceeded its
powers in subjecting states to federal age discrimination suits by their
employees under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).
This case provided an opportunity for the Court to refine its landmark
ruling in Seminole Tribe3 in which the Court held that Congress, under its
Article I powers, lacked the power to abrogate states' immunity. In order
to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity, Congress must have (1)
"unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the immunity" and (2)
violate federal statutory obligations is coextensive with its power to impose
those obligations on the States in the first place. Neither the Eleventh
Amendment nor the doctrine of sovereign immunity places any limit on that
power.
It is the Framers' compromise giving each State equal representation in the
Senate that provides the principal structural protection for the sovereignty of
the several States. The Framers also directed that the House be composed of
Representatives selected by voters in the several States, the consequence of
which is that "the states are the strategic yardsticks for the measurement of
interest and opinion, the special centers of political activity, the separate
geographical determinants of national as well as local politics."
... ITlhe [Eleventh] Amendment only places a textual limitation on the
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. Because the Amendment is a part
of the Constitution, I have never understood how its limitation on the
diversity jurisdiction of federal courts defined in Article III could be
"abrogated" by an Act of Congress. Here, however, private petitioners did
not invoke the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction; they are citizens of the
same State as the defendants and they are asserting claims that arise under
federal law. Thus, today's decision (relying as it does on Seminole Tribe)
rests entirely on a novel judicial interpretation of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, which the Court treats as though it were a constitutional precept.
It is nevertheless clear to me that if Congress has the power to create the
federal rights that these petitioners are asserting, it must also have the power
to give the federal courts jurisdiction to remedy violations of those rights,
even if it is necessary to "abrogate" the Court's "Eleventh Amendment"
version of the common-law defense of sovereign immunity to do so. That is
the essence of the Court's holding in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.... I
remain convinced [it] was correctly decided.
Id.
30. 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000).
31. 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996).
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"acted pursuant to a valid exercise of power.'3 2 In Kimel, the Court decided
that while Congress did unequivocally express its intent to abrogate state
immunity under the ADEA,33 it did not act pursuant to a valid exercise of
power. Specifically, applying the "congruence and proportionality" test
established in City of Boerne v. Flores,' the Court found that the ADEA is
not "appropriate legislation" under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment.35
In Kimel, the Court explained:
... Congress' power "to enforce" the [Fourteenth] Amendment
includes the authority both to remedy and to deter violation of
rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader
swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by
the Amendment's text.
Nevertheless, we have also recognized that the same language that
serves as the basis for the affirmative grant of congressional power
also serves to limit that power. For example, Congress cannot
"decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions
on the States .... It has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the
power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation."...
In City of Boerne, we noted that the determination whether
purportedly prophylactic legislation constitutes appropriate
remedial legislation, or instead effects a substantive redefinition of
the Fourteenth Amendment right at issue, is often difficult ....
Accordingly, recognizing that "Congress must have wide latitude
in determining where [that line] lies," we held that "[tihere must be
a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.,
36
The Court then found the ADEA to violate the congruence and
proportionality test. First, noting that the Court has "considered claims of
unconstitutional age discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause three
times" and found each time that they did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause, the majority concluded that "the substantive requirements the
ADEA imposes on state and local governments are disproportionate to any
unconstitutional conduct that conceivably could be targeted by the Act."37
32. Id. at 55 (internal quotations omitted).
33. 528 U.S. at 72-78.
34. 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
35. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81-88.
36. Id. at 81 (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 83.
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The Court distinguished the case of age discrimination from that of race or
sex discrimination, stating:
Age classifications, unlike governmental conduct based on race or
gender, cannot be characterized as "so seldom relevant to the
achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in
such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy."
Older persons, again, unlike those who suffer discrimination on the
basis of race or gender, have not been subjected to a "history of
purposeful unequal treatment." Old age also does not define a
discrete and insular minority because all persons, if they live out
their normal life spans, will experience it. Accordingly,. . . age is
not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause.38
The majority stated that "the ADEA makes unlawful, in the
employment context, all 'discriminat[ion] against any individual...
because of such individual's age"' 39 and thus "prohibits substantially more
state employment decisions and practices than would likely be held
unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection, rational basis
standard."'  Moreover, the majority found that the ADEA was not
reasonable prophylactic legislation but rather an attempt to redefine the
states' legal obligations. The Court found that "the ADEA's legislative
record confirms that Congress' 1974 extension of the Act to the states was
an unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem. Congress
never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the states, much less
any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional
violation."" The majority thus concluded that
[i]n light of the indiscriminate scope of the Act's substantive
requirements, and the lack of evidence of widespread and
unconstitutional age discrimination by the States... the ADEA is
not a valid exercise of Congress' power under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The ADEA's purported abrogation of the
States' sovereign immunity is accordingly invalid.
This case is merely the latest in a series of cases invalidating
congressional authority to abrogate States' immunity.4 3 These cases, in
38. Id. (citations omitted).
39. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994).
40. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86.
41. Id. at89.
42. Id. at 91.
43. See generally Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings
Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy
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general, suggest that the Court will carefully scrutinize any attempt by
Congress to hold states to a federal statutory standard that exceeds the floor
established by the Fourteenth Amendment. Section Five merely grants
Congress the right to "enforce" the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment,
not to establish standards that provide heightened protection to individuals
vis-a-vis the states. Additionally, although the Court has recognized that
"[d]ifficult and intractable problems often require powerful remedies,
'"
and Congress is not precluded by Section Five from enacting reasonably
prophylactic legislation, Congress must provide sufficient reasons for such
action by demonstrating evidence of the evil perpetrated by the states that it
purports to remedy.
The same month Kimel was decided, the Fifth Circuit, in Pederson v.
Louisiana State University, determined that Congress has the power,
under Section Five, to abrogate states' immunity under Title IX. Finding
that there is no dispute that Congress unambiguously expressed its intent to
abrogate states' immunity pursuant to section 2000d-7,4" the only issue
before the court was whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid exercise of
power.' The court acknowledged that Title IX was enacted pursuant to
Congress' Article I spending power but further noted that the subjective
intent of Congress in enacting legislation is irrelevant." Thus, if Congress
could have enacted Title IX pursuant to its Section Five powers it could
validly abrogate states' immunity.'9
The court turned to its analysis in Lesage v. Texas, ° in which a Fifth
Circuit panel had held that Title VI, which proscribes racial discrimination
in federally-funded public institutions, as well as the subsequent explicit
abrogation of state sovereign immunity to permit federal enforcement of
Title VI, were within Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth
Clarification Act (Patent Remedy Act), which subjected states to patent infringement suits,
was not appropriate legislation under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment); College
Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999)
(held that sovereign immunity was neither validly abrogated by the Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act (TRCA), nor voluntarily waived by the state's activities in interstate
commerce); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (held that FLSA provision authorizing
private suits against states is unconstitutional abrogation of state immunity); City of Boeme
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA) was not appropriate legislation under Section Five).
44. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88.
45. 201 F.3d 388, 404-05 (5th Cir. 2000).
46. See supra text accompanying note 25.
47. Pederson, 201 F.3d at 404.
48. See id. at 405.
49. See id. at 405-06.
50. 158 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 1998).
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Amendment." The Lesage court found that Title VI "prohibits precisely
that which the Constitution prohibits in virtually all possible
applications."5 The court did note that "[t]he text of the statute apparently
does not account for a constitutionally permissible race-based distinction,"53
citing United States v. Paradise,54 as an example of a case in which a
narrowly tailored race-based remedy survived scrutiny. However, because
so few race-based classifications are permissible, the court concluded that
"[i]t can therefore hardly be argued that the statute does not reflect
'congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end."' 55 Thus, Congress could
have enacted Title VI pursuant to its Section Five powers. Moreover, even
if subjective intent were relevant,
it is the statute abrogating immunity, not the particular substantive
provision of the statute, which specifically concerns us. Congress
unquestionably enacted 42 U.S.C. [section] 2000d-7 with the
"intent" to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment's congressional
enforcement power .... The Congressional Record contains
specific references to exercising congressional power under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to accomplish this
abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 6
Extending this analysis to Title IX's proscription of sex discrimination
in federally-funded educational institutions, the Pederson court stated:
We believe it beyond peradventure that Title IX meets the test first
explained in Seminole Tribe and recently clarified by College
Savings Bank and Florida Prepaid. Congress expressed a clear
intent to abrogate immunity with CRREA, and that Act was
appropriately passed under Congress's [section] 5 power to remedy
past discrimination. As such, it was appropriate legislation itself
and its goal-protecting the reach of Title IX and other similar
51. Id. at217.
52. Id.
53. Id. at217 n.2.
54. 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (district court order imposing fifty percent promotion
requirement on the Alabama Department of Public Safety for the selection of new state
trooper corporals was permissible under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, in that it was justified by compelling governmental interest in eradicating
discriminatory exclusion of blacks from positions and was narrowly tailored to serve its
purposes).
55. Lesage, 158 F.3d at 217 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520
(1997)).
56. Id. at 218 (citation omitted).
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statutes-was, by extension, also appropriateY
While the conclusion in Pederson might very well be correct, the
reasoning of the court lacks the substantive support the Supreme Court has
recently found necessary before upholding congressional power to abrogate
states' immunity under the "congruence and proportionality" test. 8 "In
order to enact 'appropriate' legislation under the remedial power of Section
Five, Congress must identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth
Amendment's substantive provisions and must tailor its legislative scheme
to remedy or to prevent such conduct."59 Sex discrimination, while subject
to heightened scrutiny, is not subject to strict scrutiny as is race
discrimination. The scope of Title IX, proscribing all forms of sex
discrimination in federally-funded educational programs, does not allow for
sex-based classifications tailored to serve important governmental interests.
Thus, a state may argue that Congress is exceeding its power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment by proscribing constitutional sex-based
discrimination. It is significant that the Court in Kimel distinguished age
57. 201 F.3d 388,407 (5th Cir. 2000).
58. In fact, other circuits finding that Congress validly abrogated states' immunity under
Title IX fall into the same trap of concluding without any serious "congruence and
proportionality" analysis. See Franks v. Kentucky Sch. for the Deaf, 142 F.3d 360, 363 (6th
Cir. 1998) ("Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the authority to
enforce the Amendment's substantive provisions which proscribe, inter alia, sex
discrimination in education. Since Title IX also proscribes gender discrimination in
education, it follows that Congress had the authority, pursuant to Section Five, to make Title
IX applicable to the states.") (citation omitted). Furthermore in Doe v. University of ll., 138
F.3d 653, 660 (7th Cir. 1998) the Seventh Circuit stated:
The appropriate question is, were "the objectives of [Title IX] ... within
Congress' power under the [Fourteenth] amendment?" The answer is, quite
plainly, that they were. As the court below noted.., protecting Americans
against "invidious discrimination of any sort, including that on the basis of
sex," is a central function of the federal government. Prohibiting "arbitrary,
discriminatory government conduct.., is the very essence of the guarantee
of 'equal protection of the laws' of the Fourteenth Amendment." Title IX
prohibits such discriminatory government conduct on the basis of sex when
it occurs in the context of State-run, federally funded educational programs
and institutions. This Court holds, therefore, that Congress enacted Title IX
and extended it to the States, at least in part, as a valid exercise of its powers
under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. For that reason, Congress
validly abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit when
it passed the Equalization Act expressly making States subject to suits to
enforce Title IX.
(citations omitted). See also Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1283 (8th Cir. 1997)
("Because the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that those substantive provisions
proscribe gender discrimination in education, see, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515 (1996), we are unable to understand how a statute enacted specifically to combat such
discrimination could fall outside the authority granted to Congress by § 5.").
59. Pederson, 201 F.3d at 407 (citation omitted).
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discrimination from both race and sex discrimination, noting that a state
may often meet rational basis scrutiny in enacting age-based legislation:
But this does not automatically save all sex-based legislation. Without
more, it is unclear that the current Court would so easily uphold Congress'
abrogation of state immunity under Title IX.
2. Waiving States' Immunity
Even if the Supreme Court were to find that Congress lacked the
authority to abrogate states' immunity under Title IX, private plaintiffs
have a strong argument that by accepting federal funds, states waive their
immunity from suit in federal court. Just last term, the Court in College
Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board
limited the conditions under which a state may be found to have impliedly
waived its immunity by formally overruling Parden v. Terminal Railroad
of Alabama Docks Department.6' The parties had argued that:
[A] Parden-style waiver of immunity [applied] so long as the
following two conditions are satisfied: First, Congress must
provide unambiguously that the State will be subject to suit if it
engages in certain specified conduct governed by federal
regulation. Second, the State must voluntarily elect to engage in
the federally regulated conduct that subjects it to suit.
62
The Court disagreed, finding that the "constructive-waiver experiment
of Parden was ill conceived."63 The Court noted that (1) "Parden-style
waivers are simply unheard of in the context of other constitutionally
protected privileges" 64 and (2) "[rlecognizing a congressional power to
exact constructive waivers of sovereign immunity through the exercise of
Article I powers would also, as a practical matter, permit Congress to
circumvent the antiabrogation holding of Seminole Tribe."65 The Court,
however, distinguished Parden-style waivers from those based upon a
state's acceptance of federal funds.
[W]e have held in such cases as South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.
203, 107 S. Ct. 2793, 97 L. Ed. 2d 171 (1987), that Congress may,
in the exercise of its spending power, condition its grant of funds to
the States upon their taking certain actions that Congress could not
60. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000).
61. 527 U.S. 666 (1999) overruling Parden v. Terminal R.R. of Alabama Docks Dep't,
377 U.S. 184 (1964).
62. Id. at 679.
63. Id. at 680.
64. Id. at 681.
65. Id. at 683.
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require them to take, and that acceptance of the funds entails an
agreement to the actions. These cases seem to us fundamentally
different from the present one .... Congress has no obligation to
use its Spending Clause power to disburse funds to the States; such
funds are gifts. In the present case, however, what Congress
threatens if the State refuses to agree to its condition is not the
denial of a gift or gratuity, but a sanction: exclusion of the State
from otherwise permissible activity [advertising in interstate
commerce].66
Within one month of this decision, the Fourth Circuit, in Litman v.
George Mason University,67 held that George Mason University (GMU), a
state instrumentality, waived its sovereign immunity from suit in federal
court by voluntarily accepting federal education funding under Title IX.
The court first noted that a state may
"[W]aive its immunity by voluntarily participating in federal
spending programs when Congress expresses 'a clear intent to
condition participation in the programs ... on a State's consent to
waive its constitutional immunity."'... But because of the
Eleventh Amendment's vital role in preserving the federal balance,
determinations of whether a state has waived its immunity are
subjected to "stringent," exacting standards.'
Thus, the "mere receipt of federal funds cannot establish that a State has
consented to suit in federal court."'69
Turning to the Title IX framework, the court found that the statute
provides unambiguously for a waiver of immunity as a condition on the
receipt of federal education funds. The court summarized Congress'
Spending Clause power as follows:
As a federal spending program, it operates "much in the nature of a
contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply
with federally imposed conditions." In other words, in exercising
its spending power, the federal government "condition[s] an offer
of federal funding on a promise by the recipient not to
discriminate, in what amounts essentially to a contract between the
Government and the recipient of funds." And it also conditions
66. Id. at 686-87.
67. 186 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999) (Ms. Litman brought suit against GMU under Title IX,
claiming sex discrimination and sexual harassment by employees of GMU.).
68. Id. at 550 (citation omitted).
69. Id. at 551 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246-47 (1985)
(citations omitted)).
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these funds on the recipient state's consent to be sued in federal
court for an alleged breach of the promise not to discriminate ....
Spending Clause legislation, in contrast to other Article I
legislation or Section Five legislation, presents a state with a
choice: the state can either comply with certain congressionally
mandated conditions in exchange for federal funds or not comply
and decline the funds .... This mechanism for exercising power
under the Spending Clause, however, must have limits .... First,
the exercise of the spending power must be for the general welfare.
Second, if the grant or expenditure is, when made to the states,
accompanied by conditions, the conditions must be stated
"unambiguously." Third, any conditions imposed must "bear some
relationship to the purpose of the federal spending" so that a
reasonable nexus exists between the two. Fourth, the grant or
expenditure and the conditions attached to it may not violate any
independent constitutional prohibition. And fifth, the financial
inducement offered by Congress must not be "so coercive as to
pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion." 70
The question thus becomes whether the conditions on the receipt of
federal funds under Title IX-that the recipient (1) not discriminate based
on sex 71 and (2) waive its sovereign immunity when responding to alleged
acts of discrimination 2-- fall within these limitations on Congress'
spending power. First, it was not disputed that Title IX funds are spent for
the general welfare, that the two conditions are reasonably related to grants
of education funds or that the attachment of these conditions to the funding
arrangement is not coercive. Rather, GMU argued:
[I]t did not knowingly waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity
because that condition of waiver was not made unambiguously
clear in the text of [section] 2000d-7(a)(1) [since the provision]
uses neither the term "condition" nor the term "waiver" and ... "it
is constitutionally impossible for Congress to require the States to
waive the Eleventh Amendment as a condition of receiving federal
funds. 73
First, the court found that GMU did knowingly waive its immunity.
Under Title IX a recipient must apply for federal funding and must
manifest its intent to comply with the federal regulations imposed on the
70. Id. at 551-53 (citations omitted).
71. See 20 U.S.C. § 168 1(a) (2000).
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (2000).
73. Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 553 (4th Cir. 1999).
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receipt of such funds.74 Among the conditions of receipt is the waiver
provision of section 2000d-7(a)(1), which the Supreme Court has
characterized as "unequivocal."75 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit rejected
GMU's
assertion that a statute "must say something like 'as a condition of
receiving federal funds under this Act, the States agree to waive
their Eleventh Amendment immunity."' The only difference
between GMU's proffered language and that employed in § 2000d-
7(a)(1) is that the former is cast in the affirmative (i.e., "the States
agree to waive") and the latter in the negative (i.e., "a State shall
not be immune"). But this difference in phrasing is of no
constitutional import.76
Next, the court found no merit in GMU's contention that Congress may
not require states to waive their immunity as a condition of receiving
federal funds.' While Congress may not use its Spending Clause power to
induce states to act unconstitutionally, "the range of permissible conditions
extend beyond the original enumerations of congressional power granted
by the Constitution."" Further, "while abrogating Eleventh Amendment
immunity would be impossible unless exercised under the Fourteenth
Amendment, conditioning federal funds on an unambiguous waiver of a
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity is as permissible as a state's direct
waiver of such immunity."'  The Fourth Circuit, quoting the Court in
College Savings Bank, recognized that unlimited "congressional power to
exact constructive waivers of sovereign immunity through the exercise of
Article I powers would also, as a practical matter, permit Congress to
circumvent the antiabrogation holding of Seminole Tribe."8 Nevertheless,
74. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.4(a) (2000) (providing, in pertinent part, that "[e]very application
for Federal financial assistance for any education program or activity shall as condition of
its approval contain or be accompanied by an assurance from the applicant or recipient,
satisfactory to the Assistant Secretary, that each education program or activity operated by
the applicant or recipient and to which this part applies will be operated in compliance with
this part").
75. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 198 (1996). The Court in Atascadero held that section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. section 794, did not unequivocally
demonstrate Congress' intent to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 473
U.S. 234, 245-46 (1985). Section 2000d-7 was a response to that decision. See Pederson v.
Louisiana State Univ., 201 F.3d 388, 404 n.17 (5th Cir. 2000).
76. Litman, 186 F.3d at 554.
77. See id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 555.
80. Id. at 556 (quoting College Savings Bank v. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd., 527
U.S. 666 (1999)).
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Seminole Tribe and its progeny do not
preclude Congress from conditioning federal grants on a state's
consent to be sued in federal court to enforce the substantive
conditions of the federal spending program. Indeed, to do so
would affront the Court's acknowledgment in Seminole Tribe of
"the unremarkable... proposition that States may waive their
sovereign immunity." Furthermore, in New York the Court
emphasized that principles of federalism do not pose an
independent constitutional bar to Congress' powers under the
Spending Clause: "By [employing the spending power to attach
conditions on the States' receipt of federal funding], as by any
other permissible method of encouraging a State to conform to
federal policy choices, the residents of the State retain the ultimate
decision as to whether or not the State will comply. If a State's
citizens view federal policy as sufficiently contrary to local
interests, they may elect to decline a federal grant."
8'
Thus, to summarize, under a theory of abrogation and/or waiver,
harassed students likely retain the right to hold state instrumentalities liable
for damages in federal court for violations of Title IX. Moreover, such a
result is wholly consistent with basic federalism principles. Congress,
acting pursuant to its Article I spending power and its Section Five
Fourteenth Amendment power, enacted Title IX, recognizing the important
federal interest in eradicating sex discrimination in our nation's schools.
The remaining question, however, is whether student-on-student sexual
harassment constitutes sex discrimination.
III. SEX DISCRIMINATION
The federalism argument above is founded on a belief that the conduct
at issue in Davis-student-on-student sexual harassment that is so severe,
pervasive and objectively offensive that it has a systemic effect on the
educational programs and thus deprives the victims of access to educational
opportunities-constitutes sex discrimination. The majority was correct to
find that such harassment constitutes sex discrimination; however, the
argument would be more persuasive if the Court had explained directly the
theoretical justification for such a result.
The majority grounded its reasoning on the statutory text of Title IX,
which protects students from being "excluded from participation in" or
"denied the benefits of' any education program.82 Thus, if the peer sexual
81. Id. (citations omitted).
82. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999).
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harassment deprives victims of educational opportunities on the basis of
their sex, it should be deemed sex discrimination. The majority explained
that whether the harassing conduct rises to a level of "actionable"
harassment, i.e. discrimination,
depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances,
expectations, and relationships, including but not limited to, the
ages of the harasser and the victim and the number of individuals
involved.... [U]nlike the adult workplace,... students often
engage in insults, banter, teasing, shoving, pushing, and gender-
specific conduct that is upsetting to the students subjected to it.
Damages are not available for simple acts of teasing and name-
calling among school children, however. 3
The victim must demonstrate "a concrete, negative effect on her ... ability
to receive an education."
The dissent, in contrast, stated that to classify student-on-student sexual
harassment as sex discrimination erases, "in one stroke, all differences
between children and adults, peers and teachers, schools and workplaces.""
What are the differences to which the dissent referred? There are several
differences that distinguish schools and workplaces, among them are: (1)
the degree of socialization of the harassers and victims; (2) the presumed
competence of the harassers and victims to make informed choices about
sexuality; (3) the degree of hierarchy in each setting; (4) the level of control
that harassers exercise over the setting and (5) the history of female access
to or male entitlement in the respective environments."
These differences do not support a finding that peer sexual harassment
in schools is not sex discrimination. The first two differences, the degree
of socialization and presumed competence of the harassers and their
victims, will differentiate the type of conduct considered sex discrimination
in the school setting from that in the employment context. However, these
differences do not negate the fact that certain student peer sexual
harassment can comprise sex discrimination because the harm of sexual
harassment in the schools is qualitatively the same as the harm of sexual
harassment in the workplace.' The dissent in the Eleventh Circuit Davis
decision quite persuasively argued that it is equally important, if not more
83. Id. at 651-52 (citations omitted).
84. Id. at 654.
85. Id. at 675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
86. See generally Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83
CORNLLL. REv. 1169 (1998).
87. See Katherine Franke, Gender, Sex, Agency and Discrimination: A Reply to Professor
Abrams, 83 CORNELLL. REv. 1245, 1247 (1998) [hereinafter Franke, Reply].
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so, to protect students from sexual harassment than to protect workers from
sexual harassment since
the damage caused by the sexual harassment also is arguably
greater in the classroom than in the workplace, because the
harassment has a greater and longer lasting impact on its young
victims, and institutionalizes sexual harassment as accepted
behavior. "Moreover, a nondiscriminatory environment is essential
to maximum intellectual growth and is therefore an integral part of
the educational benefits that a student receives."88
"[S]chool is a place where girls gain a sense of themselves as
competent, confident, and independent individuals.., sexual harassment
affects girls educationally, emotionally, and physically,"89 making them feel
more afraid and less self-confident. "A sexually abusive environment
inhibits, if not prevents, the harassed student from developing her full
intellectual potential and receiving the most from the academic program. '90
Neither do the differences in the degree of hierarchy, level of control,
nor history of access prevent student-on-student sexual harassment from
being characterized as sex discrimination. First, a broad view of power
encompasses societal structures that reinforce the harasser's dominance
over the victim. As Daniel McBride states:
Subordination by student sexual harassment relies, in part, upon the
conveyance of structural power from the school to the
harassers .... By refusing to act, the school cedes power to the
student to control the victim's educational environment. The
harassing student then derives a measure of subordinating power
over the victim by creating a hostile environment and controlling
the level of hostility.9
Second, "the ability to control and influence behavior exists to an even
greater extent in the classroom than in the workplace, as students look to
88. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390. 1417 n.7 (11th Cir. 1997)
(Barkett, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
89. Franke, Reply, supra note 87, at 1248 (citing OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC., SEXUAL HARASSMENT: IT'S NOT ACADEMIC (1997) (noting that "[slexual harassment
can threaten a student's physical or emotional well-being, influence how well a student does
in school, and make it difficult for a student to achieve his or her career goals"); see also
Nan Stein, Secrets in Public: Sexual Harassment in Public (And Private) Schools, Center
for Research on Women Working Paper No. 256 (1993) (recounting the effects of sexual
harassment on students).
90. Davis, 120 F.3d at 1417 n.7.
9 1. Daniel McBride, Guidance for Student Peer Sexual Harassment? Not!, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 523, 545 (1998).
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their teachers for guidance as well as for protection."92 Third, there is a
history of denial of educational opportunities to females' demonstrating
similarities between the history of women's access to education and their
access to the workplace.
There is a strong body of work analyzing the theoretical bases for
characterizing sexual harassment as sex discrimination. Several
commentators have developed theoretical models to justify sexual
harassment as a form of sex discrimination. 14 These models have been
derived, primarily, in the context of employment discrimination; however,
one can apply this jurisprudence to student-on-student sexual harassment in
order to demonstrate that student peer sexual harassment can constitute sex
discrimination.95 There are basically four theories explaining why sexual
harassment is sex discrimination." The following very briefly describes
each theory and discusses their relevance to the Davis decision and to peer
sexual harassment in schools.
First, sexual harassment is sex discrimination because it violates formal
equality principles. The underlying tenet is that "sexual harassment limits
women in a way men are not limited." 7  Thus, women are forced to
overcome obstacles that similarly situated men are not. This violates our
notions of fairness because individuals are being treated differently based
solely on their sex rather than upon standards of merit. The majority in
Davis implicitly relied on this model to justify finding that student peer
sexual harassment is sex discrimination by requiring that the harassment be
92. Davis, 120 F.3d at 1417 n.7.
93. See, e.g., Pamela J. Smith, Looking Beyond Traditional Educational Paradigms:
When Old Victims Become New Victimizers, HAMLINE L. REV. 101, 108-12 (1999); see also
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 537 (1996) (Justice Ginsburg summarized the
history of women in higher education in Virginia as follows: "First, protection of women
against higher education; next, schools for women far from equal in resources and stature to
schools for men; finally, conversion of the separate schools to coeducation."); 2 THOMAS
WOODY, A HISTORY OF WOMEN'S EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 254 (1929).
94. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683
(1998); Abrams, supra note 86; Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual
Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691 (1997) [hereinafter Franke, Sexual Harassment]; Anita
Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 446 (1997);
CATHARIE MACKINNON, SExuAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION (1979).
95. See generally McBride, supra note 91.
96. Commentators disagree over the adequacy of each theory described here. See, e.g.,
Franke, Sexual Harassment, supra note 94, at 729-62 (criticizing theories of formal equality,
purely sexual, and subordination). However, my purpose today is not to endorse nor
critique these theories but to suggest that they can be applied to the school context although
they were developed in the context of the workplace, and thus lend support to the finding
that actionable student-on-student sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination.
97. Franke, Sexual Harassment, supra note 94, at 706.
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such as to deny victims equal access to educational opportunities,"98 the
harassment limits girls in a way that boys are not limited. This finding is
supported by studies that have confirmed that "peer sexual harassment
creates unequal educational opportunities between males and females."'
A second theory used to demonstrate why sexual harassment is sex
discrimination is that it is sexual. This theory is founded on a belief that
the sexual aspect of the harassment has the "effect and purpose of
sexualizing women by reducing their humanity generally, and their status
as workers to objects of male sexual pleasure."' °  There is a problem,
however, with extending such a theory to the school context. The theory is
founded on a belief that sexual conduct of any kind is inappropriate in the
workplace.' 1 However, a certain amount of sexual conduct is appropriate
in the school context since school provides a forum for students to meet
and date other students while exploring their sexuality. Thus, this theory, if
appropriate at all, would require careful application in the school context.
A third theory is that sexual harassment is sex discrimination because it
is sexually subordinating. This theory is based upon a view that "women's
situation is a structural problem of enforced inferiority."'" Catharine
MacKinnon defined this approach in terms of what it does, it "replicates
and perpetuates a sexual hierarchy in which men possess and maintain their
power by virtue of their ability to define women in terms of their
sexuality."'0 3 The Davis dissent implicitly recognized this model of sexual
harassment but interpreted the model narrowly, suggesting that only a
formal power relationship between the harasser and victim will satisfy such
a model and, thus, student-on-student sexual harassment does not qualify as
sex discrimination.'O However, as stated above,' 5 a broader view of power
recognizes the conveyance of structural power to the individual harasser,
which in turn can have the effect of subordinating the victim even if the
harasser and victim are similarly situated.
Finally, Katherine Franke argues that sexual harassment is sex
discrimination because it establishes a technology of sexism." This theory
98. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999).
99. McBride, supra note 91, at 542; see also Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120
F.3d 1390, 1417 (11th Cir. 1997) ("[A] female student should not be required to run a
gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to obtain an
education.").
100. Franke, Sexual Harassment, supra note 94, at 715.
101. See id. at725.
102. Id. at 726.
103. Id. at 728 (quoting MACKINNON, supra note 94, at 4-5).
104. 526 U.S. 629, 675 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
105. See supra text accompanying note 91.
106. Franke, Sexual Harassment, supra note 94, at 762-7 1.
[Vol. 12:1
DISPELLING THE MISCONCEPTIONS
is perhaps the most satisfying as it equally accounts for different, as well
as, same-sex sexual harassment. This theory conceptualizes sexual
harassment as one of gender subordination defined in hetero-patriarchal
terms that constructs the identifies of men and women according to
fundamental gender stereotypes: men as sexual conquerors and women as
sexually conquered." Further, it recognizes that such sexism "is also
capable of oppressing some men by terrorizing, stigmatizing and inducing
conformity among men who are effeminate, are sexually inexperienced, or
depart in other ways from conventional masculinity."' 3  Moreover,
Professor Franke contends that her theory is as relevant in the school
context as it is in the workplace, contending that the wrong of school-based
sexual harassment is not different in any principled way from the wrong of
workplace sexual harassment.'O9 As Professor Franke explained so well in
her reply to Professor Abrams:
I raise the example of sexual harassment in the schools to illustrate
the ways in which the sexual harassment of women by men in
many different contexts, not just the workplace, operates as a
means by which women are sexualized, women are feminized,
women's competence is called into question, and various public
and private fora are preserved as domains best suited to hetero-
masculine men. Even though the harassment of men by women
seemingly excuses men from the injury this conduct inflicts, I
maintain that harassment of this kind serves to discipline men as
well. Both the perpetrators of, and male witnesses to, the sexual
harassment of women by men are subject to a regulatory practice
that inscribes, enforces, and polices hetero-patriarchal gender
norms in men. Men who sexually harass women are teaching both
men and women a lesson about gendered power. This lesson,
discipline, or enactment of hetero-patriarchal power can take place
in the workplace, schools, athletics, political institutions, and
countless other institutional settings within any culture. Each
location contributes a unique set of intersectional dynamics that
render the sting of gender discipline painful and effective in
different ways. However, this fact does not undermine the
overarching notion that the wrong of sexual harassment lies in its
function as a technology of sexism. "'
107. See Abrams, supra note 86, at 1191.
108. Id. at 1192.
109. Franke, Reply, supra note 87, at 1248.
110. Id. at 1249.
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Thus, there exists theoretical support for categorizing student peer
sexual harassment actionable under Title IX as sex discrimination, which,
in turn, supports federal protection of equal rights consistent with our
notions of federalism.
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF THE HARASSER
Finally, the Davis dissent argued that public schools held liable for
student-on-student sexual harassment will be caught in a double-bind
between the free speech rights of the harasser and the rights of the victim to
be free from discrimination, which will in turn constrain schools' ability to
discipline the harasser."' First, it is important to note that student peer
harassment cases to date have involved unwanted touching in addition to
vulgar speech."' Under these circumstances, the school would have every
right to discipline the harassing student for the tortious conduct. Further, if
the harassment is pure speech that qualifies as "fighting words"-words,
which by their very utterance are directed at an individual and inflict injury
or intend to incite an immediate breach of the peace-it is not protected."3
However, if the harassment is based solely on the harasser's speech, which
does not meet such criteria, a First Amendment conflict may arise.
A. THE COLLISION BETWEEN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW AND FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE
While the Supreme Court has not dealt directly with the possible
collision between sexual harassment laws and First Amendment rights,''
111. 526 U.S. 629, 664-69 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
112. See, e.g., Davis, 526 U.S. 629 (fifth-grade student was sexually harassed over six-
month period by boys trying to touch her breasts and vaginal area and directing vulgarities
at her); Oona, R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City Schs., 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1455-57 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(boys repeatedly referred to eleven-year-old girl's private parts as "melons" and "beavers,"
and student teacher fondled girl's buttocks), aff'd sub nom. Oona, R.-S. v. McCaffrey, 122
F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 1997); Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir.
1996) (while on bus, boys repeatedly harassed eighth-grade girls, swatting their bottoms,
groping their genital areas and commenting "When are you going to let me fuck you?"),
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 861 (1996). But see Emmalena Quesada, Innocent Kiss or Potential
Legal Nightmare: Peer Sexual Harassment and the Standard of School Liability Under Title
IX, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1014, 1015-16 (1998) (discussing the publicity two young school
boys received after being reprimanded for kissing a schoolmate). In the case of the young
boys being reprimanded for kissing a schoolmate, the school principals claimed that such
behavior violated the school's policy against sexual harassment, although such a trivial,
isolated incident does not rise to the level of sexual harassment. See id. at 1018.
Nevertheless, such publicity detracts from the seriousness of the real problem of sexual
harassment on our campuses.
113. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
114. The Court had an opportunity in the Title VII case Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,
510 U.S. 17 (1993), to confront the issue but declined to do so, making no reference to the
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several commentators have analyzed the issue in the context of the
workplace"5 and the university."6 Just last year, the California Supreme
Court, in Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., held that
a remedial injunction prohibiting the continued use of racial
epithets in the workplace does not violate the right to freedom of
speech if there has been a judicial determination that the use of
such epithets will contribute to the continuation of a hostile or
abusive work environment and therefore will constitute
employment discrimination.'
The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari". with Justice Thomas
dissenting." 9 Avis was held liable under the Fair Employment Housing Act
(FEHA), the California counterpart to Title VII, for allowing its manager to
verbally harass Latino employees using derogatory racial epithets. Avis
appealed on the ground that the injunction was an illegal prior restraint on
speech.'2 Justice Thomas, however, noted that "[a]ttaching liability to the
utterance of words in the workplace," which do not qualify as fighting
words, obscenity or some other category recognized as outside the scope of
First Amendment protection,
First Amendment issues raised by both sides in the case.
115. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment
Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 481 (1991); Richard Fallon, Jr.,
Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog that Didn't Bark,
1994 Sup. CT. REv. 1; Jules Gerard, The First Amendment in a Hostile Environment: A
Primer on Free Speech and Sexual Harassment, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1003 (1993);
Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment
and the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 RurGERS L. Rv. 461 (1995); Marcy
Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1990).
116. See, e.g., Amy Candido, Comment, A Right to Talk Dirty?: Academic Freedom
Values and Sexual Harassment in the University Classroom, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE
85 (1997); Beverly Earle & Anita Cava, The Collision of Rights and a Search for Limits:
Free Speech in the Academy and Freedom from Sexual Harassment on Campus, 18
BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAD. L. 282 (1997); Robert W. Gall, The University as an Industrial
Plant: How a Workplace Theory of Discriminatory Harassment Creates a "Hostile
Environment"for Free Speech in America's Universities, 60 LAw. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 203
(1997); Rodney A. Smolla, Academic Freedom, Hate Speech, and the Idea of a University,
53 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 (1990).
117. Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 21 Cal. 4th 121, 126 (1999), cert. denied,
120 S. Ct. 2029 (2000).
118. It is likely the Court declined certiorari in Aguilar because the appellate record below
was woefully inadequate. 21 Cal. 4th at 128, 132, 149. Moreover, the California Supreme
Court plurality opinion rested solely on the prior restraint issue and declined to address the
broader issue of whether the regulation of speech that constitutes harassment violates the
First Amendment. See id. at 131 n.3.
119. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. v. Aguliar, 120 S. Ct. 2029, 2029 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting.).
120. See id.
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is likely invalid for the simple reason that speech is fully protected
speech .... Even if these words do constitute so-called "low-value
speech," the content-based nature of FEHA's restriction-which
bars speech based upon "race, religious creed .... sex .... or
sexual orientation," but not because of ... numerous other traits-
renders it invalid under our current jurisprudence.12
Justice Thomas' statement suggests that anti-discrimination laws,
including Title IX, may be invalid if liability is founded solely on speech
(not to mention the special problems raised by the injunctive proscription
as a prior restraint). Nevertheless, we still await the full Court's
pronouncement on this difficult issue.
However, the concurring and dissenting California Justices in Aguilar
did confront the issue of whether regulation of speech that constitutes
harassment violates the First Amendment even though the petitioners chose
not to appeal the money damages portion of the judgment.' Justices
Werdegar and Brown of the California Supreme Court provided a good
summary of the scholarship to date, analyzing the collision between one's
right to equality and one's right to speak one's mind.
Justice Werdegar, in her concurrence, wrote separately to address the
preliminary question: "whether the First Amendment permits imposition of
civil liability under FEHA for pure speech that creates a racially hostile or
abusive work environment."'23 She began by noting that no matter how
distasteful the majority may find certain speech, such speech is generally
protected under the First Amendment unless it falls into an enumerated
category of speech found to lie outside the First Amendment's protection
(none of which were alleged here).'4 She then turned to the two Supreme
Court cases most relevant to this issue: R.A.V.2 and Harris.2 6 In R.A. V.
the Court held that a municipal ordinance banning certain hate speech that
met the definition of fighting words was unconstitutional because it
involved "viewpoint discrimination by prohibiting hate speech on some
topics but not others."' 2 The concurring Justices in R.A. V.
expressed concern that the majority's rationale called into question
the constitutionality of sexual harassment claims under Title
VII... Justice Scalia replied that the Title VII claims did not come
121. Id. at 2031 (internal citation omitted).
122. 21 Cal. 4th at 128.
123. Id. at 147 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
124. See id. at 151.
125. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
126. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
127. Aguilar, 21 Cal. 4th at 153.
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within the ambit of the majority's analysis: "since words can in
some circumstances violate law directed not against speech but
against conduct"... a particular content-based subcategory of a
proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally within
the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech. Thus
for example, sexually derogatory "fighting words," among other
words, may produce a violation of Title VII's general prohibition
against sexual discrimination in employment practices."
Justice Werdegar, admitting that Justice Scalia's explanation was
"unclear," suggested that "all nine Justices participating in R.A.V. assumed
that the core Title VII prohibition against speech that creates a
discriminatory hostile work environment would pass constitutional
muster."'29 Furthermore, turning to Harris, a Title VII sexual harassment
case involving the defendant's speech as a contributory factor in creating
the hostile work environment, Justice Werdegar noted that neither the
majority nor concurring opinions in Harris "mention[ed] whether harassing
speech, standing alone, may constitute a violation of Title VII consistent
with the First Amendment."'' Instead, the Harris Court simply found that a
plaintiff's entitlement to relief under Title VII does not depend upon her
ability to demonstrate psychological injury. 3'
Justice Werdegar, concluding that the question remains open, explained
that strands of First Amendment doctrine, when "taken together, indicate
that, even if speech creating a... hostile or abusive work environment is
protected by the First Amendment, such speech may be subject to some
restrictions consistent with that amendment."'32  These strands involve
balancing the following considerations: the location of the speech, the
relative captivity of the audience and the permissibility of time, place and
manner restrictions on speech. First, the Court has recognized that "strong
public policies governing the workplace-both private and public-may
justify some limitations on the free speech rights of employers and
employees," which, in turn, is consistent with the reality that workplaces
"are not usually thought of as marketplaces for the testing of political and
social ideas."'33 Second, employees are not reasonably free to walk away
from their jobs when confronted with harassing speech, further suggesting
128. Id. (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389) (alterations in original) (internal citations
omitted).
129. Id. at 154 (quoting Richard H. Fallon, Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and
the First Amendment Dog that Didn't Bark, 1994 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 12).
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. Id. at 154-55.
133. Id. at 158-59.
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that greater restrictions on speech may be tolerated in the workplace."
Finally, regarding the injunction and recognizing that it is not content-
neutral, Justice Werdegar found a compelling state interest in eliminating
unlawful discriminatory practices in private employment and, if limited to
defendant's speech within the workplace, a multitude of alternative
channels of communication remain for such speech that present a strong
case for upholding the injunction.
In contrast, dissenting Justice Brown found this analysis less than
persuasive."' He began by quoting the "bedrock principle underlying the
First Amendment .... that the government may not prohibit the expression
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable."'37 He then argued that Harris's deliberate silence does not
suggest that harassing speech which creates a hostile work environment is
not protected' and that R.A.V., if relevant at all, "suggests Title VII's
content-based regulation of speech is invalid to the extent it regulates 'fully
protected speech' like the speech at issue here [in contrast to the fighting
words proscribed in R.A.V.]."' 39 He then chastised the Aguilar plurality for
creating an exception that swallows the First Amendment by relying on the
argument
that the government is merely proscribing discriminatory conduct,
whether or not spoken words are an integral part of that conduct,
and therefore it can incidentally regulate speech in the workplace
without violating the First Amendment... [because] it is the
speaker's philosophical beliefs and opinions themselves that cause
the injury, and it is those beliefs and opinions that the government
wants to censor."°
Finally, although he claimed to find Justice Werdegar's concurring
opinion no more persuasive, he argued that the California Constitution has
balanced the scales weighing First Amendment rights against equality
rights by "requiring the speaker to pay damages for injurious speech" while
finding the prior restraint unconstitutional.'1 Thus, it appears that even
Justice Brown would not find FEHA or Title VII damages liability based
upon harassing speech violative of the First Amendment.
134. See id. at 159-61.
135. See id. at 162-65.
136. See id. at 189, 193 (Brown, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 190 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,414 (1989)).
138. Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 21 Cal. 4th 121, 126 (1999).
139. Id. at 192.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 194.
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B. THE COLLISION OF RIGHTS IN THE SCHOOL CONTEXT
Let us now turn to the education forum and Title IX liability for peer
sexual harassment of youth in schools. A critical distinction exists between
the analysis above and the issue raised by the dissent in Davis: the forum in
which the discrimination and speech take place. Two fora are relevant to
our Title IX inquiry-primary and secondary level schools and college
campuses. Let's see what implications these different fora have on the
collision of First Amendment rights and the right to be free from
discrimination.
1. Primary and Secondary Schools
At the primary and secondary school levels, the Court has recognized
that schools have two missions: to convey certain basic social and political
norms while stimulating students to think independently. The first
mission supports more rigorous regulation of students' speech while the
second supports little regulation. Thus, from a First Amendment
standpoint these two missions are often in conflict.
In attempting to balance these two goals the Court has explained that
while neither students nor teachers "shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech... at the schoolhouse gate" there is "a need for
affirming the comprehensive authority... of school officials, consistent
with fundamental constitutional safeguards .... to control conduct in
schools."' 43  Thus, when the expressive conduct "materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others," it is not constitutionally protected.' 44  In fact, "it is a highly
appropriate function for public school education to prohibit the use of
vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse"'45 in an effort to "inculcate
the habits and manners of civility as values" that are part of our democratic
society. 4"
In recent years, primary and secondary schools have enacted racial
harassment and intimidation policies in response to incidents of racial
tensions. Several courts have addressed the First Amendment
142. See Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the "Pall of Orthodoxy": Value
Training in the Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 15, 15-20.
143. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506-07 (1969).
144. Id. at 513.
145. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
146. Id. at 681.
147. See, e.g., Derby High School Racial Harassment and Intimidation Policy, which
states in relevant part:
District employees and student(s) shall not racially harass or intimidate
another student(s) by name calling, using racial or derogatory slurs, wearing
or possession of items depicting or implying racial hatred or prejudice.
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implications of these policies when violators, suspended under them, have
argued that the policies violate their right to free speech.'4 Recently, the
Tenth Circuit upheld the three-day suspension of a seventh-grade student at
Derby High School for drawing a confederate flag on a piece of paper
during math class in violation of the district's policy. The panel cited
Supreme Court precedent that "[a] school need not tolerate student speech
that is inconsistent with its basic educational mission even though the
government could not censor similar speech outside the school."'
49
"[W]here school authorities reasonably believe that a student's
uncontrolled exercise of expression might 'substantially interfere with the
work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students,' they may
forbid such expression."'50 In the case of Derby High School, the court
found that the school officials had sufficient evidence to support the
restriction of such expression based upon the history of racial tensions.'5 '
Moreover,
[t]he fact that [plaintiff's] conduct may not have resulted in an
actual disruption of the classroom.., does not mean that the
school had no authority to act. The district had the power to act to
prevent problems before they occurred; it was not limited to
prohibiting and punishing conduct only after it caused a
disturbance. '52
Most recently, in a similar case, the Eleventh Circuit found school
administrators, sued for violating a student's First Amendment rights after
disciplining him for displaying the confederate flag in violation of school
District employees and students shall not at school, on school property or at
school activities wear or have in their possession any written material, either
printed or in their own handwriting, that is racially divisive or creates ill will
or hatred. (Examples: clothing, articles, material, publications or any item
that denotes Ku Klux Klan, Aryan Nation-White Supremacy, Black Power,
Confederate flags or articles, Neo-Nazi or any other "hate" group. This list
is not intended to be all inclusive). Violations of this policy shall result in
disciplinary action by school authorities.
West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1361 (10th Cir. 2000) (emphasis
omitted from original).
148. See West, 206 F.3d at 1358. See generally Denno v. School Bd. of Volusia County,
Fla., 218 F.3d 1267 (1 1th Cir. 2000); Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1972).
149. West, 206 F.3d at 1366 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266
(1988) (internal citations and quotations omitted)); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) ("The determination of what manner of speech in the
classroom.., is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.").
150. West, 206 F.3d at 1366 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 509 (1969)).
15 1. See id. at 1366-67.
152. Id. (quoting West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1233
(1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
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policy, entitled to qualified immunity.' The court analyzed the legal
landscape of First Amendment school jurisprudence noting two guiding
standards: the Tinker "reasonable risk of disruption" standard and the more
flexible Fraser standard that allows school administrators to "balance the
freedom of... students to advocate unpopular and controversial views
against the school's interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially
appropriate behavior."'" Based upon the relevant legal landscape, the court
concluded that the actions of the individual defendants in disciplining the
student did not violate clearly established First Amendment rights under
the more flexible Fraser standard.
1 55
The school First Amendment cases relied upon in these cases, Tinker
and Fraser, establish the contours of students' rights to expression while at
school and the corresponding rights and responsibilities of school
administrators to provide a sound educational program for all its students.
In Tinker, the Court held that the school could not prohibit students from
wearing black arm bands to school to demonstrate their disapproval of the
Vietnam war unless the school could show that such expression would
"materially and substantially interfer[e] with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school."'56 Several years later,
the Court, in Fraser, upheld the authority of the school to discipline a
student who gave an offensively lewd and indecent speech at a school
assembly. 57 The Court distinguished the sexually vulgar and offensive
speech at issue in Fraser from the political views expressed in Tinker.'58
Although the political views expressed in Tinker may have been deemed
"offensive" by many, the school was not constitutionally capable of
disciplining such speech merely because it disagreed with the views
expressed.'59 In contrast, it was the vulgarity and crudeness of the words
themselves used by the student in Fraser, unrelated to the message
conveyed, that was deemed both offensive and inappropriate in an
educational environment 6°
153. See Denno v. School Bd. of Volusia County, Fla., 218 F.3d 1267, 1278 (11th Cir.
2000).
154. Id. at 1275. The court cited both West and a recent Seventh Circuit case in which the
panel noted: "Supreme Court decisions since Tinker indicate that the teaching of civility and
the inculcation of traditional moral, social, and political norms may override student
expression, or at least that it is permissible for a school board to so order its educational
priorities." Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1539 (7th Cir. 1996) (claim
brought by an elementary school child challenging the school's restriction on the child's
attempt to distribute, during non-instructional times, invitations to a religious meeting).
155. See Denno, 218 F.3d at 1278.
156. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)).
157. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
158. Id. at 680, 685.
159. 393 U.S. at 513-14.
160. 478 U.S. at 685; see Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 473-74 (6th
Cir. 2000) (Gilman, J., dissenting). Moreover, the speech in Fraser was delivered during a
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How do these principles inform the debate between the free speech
rights of the harasser and the victim's right to be free from sexual
harassment? In fact, two courts have responded to claims of a violation of
freedom of expression in the context of peer sexual harassment. In 1996, a
junior high school student brought an action against the school for failure
to stop peer sexual harassment. 6' The school defendants argued that
holding schools liable, absent discrimination on the part of the school's
agent, would unfairly place the school in a bind "between their obligation
to avoid infringing the freedom of speech of the harassers and their duty to
prevent harassment of the victim. '1 62 The district court judge disagreed,
noting that "school First Amendment cases... recognize that a student's
freedom of expression is limited both by other students' rights and by the
school's right and duty to maintain order."' 63 The court emphasized that
such "cases not only permit schools, but specifically recognize a duty on
the part of schools, to regulate the speech of their students in a manner
consistent with proper education."' 4
More recently, following the Davis decision, student plaintiffs brought
a facial challenge to a school's anti-harassment policy (patterned after Title
IX).' 65 The policy prohibited harassment based on race, sex and sexual
orientation.' 66 The plaintiffs argued that it violated their individual rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, including their free exercise
of religion. They felt compelled by their religion to speak out about the
sinful nature and harmful effect of homosexuality, which in turn might
subject them to liability for harassment. '67 The trial court granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the definition of harassment as
language or conduct that "'substantially interferes with a student's
educational performance' or which creates a hostile educational
environment"' 68 does not on its face violate the Constitution.'69 The court
recognized, however, that while under certain circumstances enforcement
of the policy may have the effect of infringing on protected liberties, the
policy itself does not have such an effect.
7
1
The Third Circuit reversed the district court, finding the policy
school-sponsored assembly in which the school administrators could reasonably have been
perceived as condoning the expression if the administrators took no action. 478 U.S. at 685.
161. See Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
162. Id. at 1426.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1426-27.
165. See Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 77 F. Supp. 2d 621 (M.D. Pa. 1999),
rev'd, 2001 WL 123852 (3d Cir. Feb. 14, 2001).
166. See 77 F. Supp. 2d at 623.
167. See id. at 622-23.
168. Id. at 625.
169. See id. at 627.
170. See id.
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overbroad."' The court found that:
[T]he policy would require the following elements before speech
could be deemed harassing: (1) verbal or physical conduct (2) that
is based on one's actual or perceived personal characteristics and
(3) that has the purpose or effect of either (3a) substantially
interfering with a student's educational performance or (3b)
creating an intimidating hostile, or offensive environment.'
The court noted that this policy is broader than that of Title IX. First, it
protects against harassment based upon "personal characteristics" not
protected under federal law.' Second, it precludes harassment that only
has the purpose of substantially interfering with a student's educational
performance, which ignores Tinker's requirement that the speech actually
cause a material disruption." Third, it prohibits harassment that creates a
hostile environment in contrast to Tinker's message that the
"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to
justify a restriction of student speech."'75  Thus, the policy covers
substantially more speech than that which will cause substantial disruption
in the educational environment and is, therefore, unconstitutionally
overbroad.
In sum, schools have a responsibility to maintain order on school
grounds and thus, if the expression is likely to lead to material disruption of
the educational environment, discipline is appropriate. Moreover, schools
have a responsibility to teach manners and civility to their students, thus if
the words (in contrast to the viewpoint)'76 expressed are vulgar and
offensive, discipline is appropriate. With these guiding principles in mind,
it appears that the Davis Court carefully drafted a standard that would
protect the harassed and the alleged harasser. Only sexual harassment,
even if purely verbal, that is so "severe, pervasive and objectively
offensive"'77 to deny the harassed educational opportunities, is actionable.
This standard carefully circumscribes prohibited speech to that which
substantially interferes or disrupts the education environment. Thus, the
standard allows schools to discipline students for sexual harassment
without violating the free speech rights of the alleged harassers. Of course,
171. Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., No. 99-4081, 2001 WL 123852 (3d Cir. Feb
14,2001).
172. Id. at *14.
173. Id. at *7.
174. See id. at *14-*15.
175. Id. at*15.
176. Contrast "Suck my dick, you bitch" with "Girls are stupid and their only contribution
to society is to make babies." While both expressions may be deemed "offensive," the
words used in the first are vulgar and offensive, independent of the viewpoint expressed,
while the second is offensive because of the viewpoint expressed.
177. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
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schools should keep in mind that this "standard reflects the cumulative
effect of all harassment on the victim.... The First Amendment, however
is an individual right that is applied incident by incident."' 8 So it is
possible that a student acting within his free speech rights on one occasion
could, when combined with other instances of improper behavior, have a
severe and pervasive harassing effect on the victim. 79 Nevertheless, under
the Court's school First Amendment jurisprudence and its Title IX
jurisprudence, it is fairly clear that schools not only are able to punish
harassers without violating their First Amendment rights, but they have an
affirmative duty to do so consistent with their educational mission.
2. College Campuses
The college campus presents a different set of considerations. The
Davis dissent focused primarily on this forum in its critique of the Davis
majority, citing four cases each striking down university speech codes
designed to deal with peer sexual and racial harassment.8 The dissent
argued that these cases demonstrate the limited nature of a university's
control over student behavior and, thus, squarely depict the bind that
college administrators face being bound by both Title IX and the First
Amendment rights of their students.' 8' As one First Amendment scholar
has indicated: the resolution of the conflict between the protection of free
speech and academic freedom on the one hand and protecting equality of
all individuals through the regulation of hate speech and the enforcement of
anti-discrimination laws on the other, "turns on how society conceives the
idea of a university."'82 Professor Smolla suggests:
For many, its [the university's] principal distinguishing
characteristic is unfettered expressive freedom... that embraces,
heart and soul, John Stuart Mill's wide-open marketplace [of
ideas]. For others.... the university is an island of equality,
civility, tolerance, and respect for human dignity; a place where the
contemplative and rational faculties of man [and woman] should
triumph over blind passion and prejudice.
8
1
Of course, these two visions are not mutually exclusive. The Court,
however, has generally emphasized the former vision. The Court has held
178. McBride, supra note 91, at 555.
179. See id.; see also Kay Kindred, When Equal Opportunity Meets Freedom of
Expression: Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment in School, 75
N.D. L. REv. 205, 208 (1999) (concluding that the First Amendment jurisprudence in the
school context permits far greater regulation of harassing speech than in other contexts).
180. 526 U.S. at 667 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
181. See id.
182. Smolla, supra note 116, at 216.
183. Id. at216-17.
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that the state cannot impose a policy that prohibits certain speech because it
disagrees with the ideas or messages conveyed or because the ideas are
themselves offensive to some.'"' Moreover, "[these principles acquire a
special significance in the university setting, where the free and unfettered
interplay of competing views is essential to the institution's educational
mission."' The university plays the "important social role of promoting
the critical spirit on which descriptive autonomy and political democracy
ultimately depend."'86
Professor Fallon has briefly addressed the extension of sexual
harassment law and competing First Amendment rights from the workplace
to the university campus'" and has suggested that while First Amendment
tensions are especially severe in the campus setting, one crucial distinction
might help to advance the analysis. Hostile environment actions
encompass two logically distinct types of claims, both of which are
actionable under Title VII: "inherently sexual speech," which conveys a
"sexuality message," and sex-based speech, which conveys a hostility
message. '  Professor Fallon suggests that the free speech values
implicated by these two types of harassment differ. On the one hand,
stringent prohibition of inherently sexual speech "would neither implicate
nor threaten any special function of the university."'8 9 On the other hand,
broad prohibition of sex-based speech is "much more likely to chill debate
at the heart of the university's critical, discursive, truth-seeking, and
pedagogical missions."'" Thus, he suggests that
prohibition against gender-based harassment by hostility messages
should be limited to speech that: (i) is intended to insult or
stigmatize on the basis of gender, (ii) is... targeted at an
individual or small group... (iii) makes use of words or symbols
that are commonly understood to convey direct, visceral hatred for
human beings on the basis of their gender, and (iv) has the purpose
or reasonably foreseeable effect of unreasonably interfering with
184. See, e.g., Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 863 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
(citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 95 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 445 (1963); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
185. Id. (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)).
186. Fallon, supra note 115, at 52 (citing Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603; Healy v. James, 408
U.S. 169, 180 (1972)).
187. See id. at 52-54.
188. Id. at 53 (quoting Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment
Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 481,492 (1991)).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 54.
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an individual's work or academic performance .... ,9'
Finally, turning to the speech code cases relied upon by the dissent,'9 '
they are distinguishable from the case of actionable peer sexual harassment
under Title IX. First, the speech codes involved were found to be vague
and overbroad. One such example is the University of Wisconsin code that
prohibited expressive behavior that is discriminatory, directed at an
individual, demeans the sex of the individual and creates an intimidating,
hostile or demeaning environment for education.'93 The court found that
the term "demean" is ambiguous and questioned whether the speech must
actually demean or merely intend to demean.'9" Moreover, "speech does
not lose its protected status merely because it inflicts injury or disgrace
onto its addressees."' 95 Additionally, the code is overbroad in that it is a
content-based restriction on the "robust exchange of ideas" on campus, and
covers a wide variety of situations where no breach of the peace is likely to
result, reaching beyond fighting words.9 6 By contrast, the standard under
Title IX in light of the Davis decision defines actionable harassment as
conduct so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that it has a
systemic effect on the educational program and deprives the victims of
access to educational opportunities. Such a standard is a more
comprehensive definition of harassment and sets the bar much higher-
requiring a finding of deprived access to opportunities. Thus, the Title IX
standard is less vulnerable to claims of vagueness and overbreadth.
Secondly, the alleged harassing speech involved in the speech code cases
tended to be isolated remarks often made in the course of academic
discussion and research, e.g., a graduate social work student openly stating
his belief that homosexuality was a disease and that he intended to develop
a counseling plan for changing gay clients to straight, '9' or a one-time
event, such as a fraternity's "ugly woman contest."'98 Such alleged
misconduct is hardly sufficiently severe or pervasive to deprive the victim
of access to educational opportunities. Neither the harassment standards
191. Id.
192. See Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995); Iota XI Chapter of
Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1993); UWM Post v.
Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1172 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v.
University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 865 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Gall, supra note 116; Earle
& Cava, supra note 116 (analyzing the First Amendment implications of campus speech
codes).
193. See UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1172.
194. See id.
195. Id. at 1172 n.7.
196. Id. at 1176-77 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-13
(1978)).
197. See Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 865 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
198. Iota XI Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386 (4th
Cir. 1993).
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nor the alleged misconduct involved in these cases are of the same nature
as that which would be actionable under Title IX."9 Thus, a school would
rarely be caught in a bind between the free speech rights of the harasser and
the rights of the victim when disciplining a student for conduct that is
clearly actionable under Title IX.
V. CONCLUSION
The majority in Davis correctly held that schools should be held liable
under Title IX for deliberate indifference to known instances of student-on-
student harassment that is so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive
that it effectively bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity.
However, the Davis majority failed to adequately address the concerns
raised by the dissent that: (1) as a matter of federalism, this issue should be
left to the states; (2) student peer sexual harassment does not constitute sex
discrimination and (3) holding schools liable for student peer sexual
harassment will place schools in a bind between protecting the harassed
and trampling the First Amendment rights of the harasser. I have attempted
to address each of these concerns directly. I have argued that the majority
decision is consistent with our basic federalism principles because
actionable student peer sexual harassment rises to the level of sex
199. Robert Gall reviewed the speech codes of six universities/colleges which he claimed
represented three approaches to dealing with First Amendment concerns raised by the
speech-code cases. See Gall, supra note 116, at 231. "The first approach ignores these
concerns," adopting the workplace concept of hostile environment unaccompanied by any
remarks suggesting that the guidelines should be tempered by notions of free expression
critical to the mission of a university. Id.; see also id. at 232 (discussing the sexual
harassment policies of Piedmont Community College in Roxboro, North Carolina and Cape
Fear Community College in Wilmington, North Carolina). The second approach uses "a
middle-ground strategy," adopting the hostile environment harassment guidelines while
stating that concepts of free expression must be respected. Id. at 231; see also id. at 232-3 8
(discussing the harassment policies of the University of Connecticut, Princeton University
and Duke University). The third approach chooses not to regulate speech based on the
hostile environment harassment concept at all. See i Instead, according to Mr. Gall, the
university "honor[s] its spirit of free inquiry while not forgetting its obligation toward
fighting discrimination." Id.; see also id. at 238-42 (discussing the non-discrimination
policy of the University of Chicago). Mr. Gall concludes that the University of Chicago
approach best accommodates free speech ideals while protecting persons from
discrimination by: (1) expressly recognizing free expression to be essential to its mission;
(2) declining to shield people from ideas that they may find disagreeable or offensive or
"enforce social standards of civility" and (3) choosing not to forbid the creation of a hostile
environment but rather specifically prohibiting "[albusive conduct [including threats of
violence] directed at a particular individual that compromises that individual's ability to
function within the University setting and that persists after the individual has asked that it
stop." Id. at 238-39. Further, the University of Chicago's policy bans sexual harassment
defined as "[s]exual advances, requests for sexual favors, or sexually-directed remarks...
when either: 1. submission to such conduct is used or threatened to be used as a basis for
academic or employment decisions; or 2. such conduct directed at an individual persists
despite its rejection." Id. at 240.
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discrimination in federally-funded educational institutions, and thus is a
matter of national concern and appropriately addressed through national
legislation pursuant to Congress' Spending Clause and Fourteenth
Amendment Section Five powers. Further, schools that enforce the
standard articulated by the Court in disciplining harassing students will
steer clear of violating the harasser's First Amendment rights.
